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Abstract 
In the UNIX/Linux environment the kernel can log every command process created by 
every user with process accounting. Thus process accounting logs have many potential 
uses, particularly the monitoring and forensic investigation of security events.  Previous 
work successfully leveraged the use of process accounting logs to identify a difficult to 
detect and damaging intrusion against high performance computing (HPC) clusters, 
masquerade attacks, where intruders masquerade as legitimate users with purloined 
authentication credentials.  While masqueraders on HPC clusters were found to be 
identifiable with a high accuracy (greater than 90%), this accuracy is still not high 
enough for HPC production environments where greater than 99% accuracy is needed.   
 
This paper incrementally advances the goal of more accurately identifying masqueraders 
on HPC clusters by seeking to identify features within command sets that distinguish 
masqueraders. To accomplish this goal, we created NVision-PA, a software tool that 
produces text and graphic statistical summaries describing input processing accounting 
logs.  We report NVision-PA results describing two different process accounting logs; 
one from Internet usage and one from HPC cluster usage.  These results identify the 
distinguishing features of Internet users (as proxies for masqueraders) posing as clusters 
users. This research is both a promising next step toward creating a real-time 
masquerade detection sensor for production HPC clusters as well as providing another 
tool for system administrators to use for statistically monitoring and managing legitimate 
workloads (as indicated by command usage) in HPC environments. 
 
Keywords: process accounting, masquerade detection, SSH identity theft, cluster 
security, high performance computing (HPC) 
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1.0   Introduction 
 
Recent attacks enabled by stolen authentication passwords and unencrypted keys methods 
(sniffed via a key-logging console program, shoulder-surfed via bad security awareness, 
poor key management practices, etc.) have allowed intruders to masquerade as legitimate 
users on high performance computing (HPC) clusters.  This paper is the logical next step 
toward the development of a proactive alarm based on analysis of user command 
behavior in order to minimize damage from intrusions on high performance computing 
(HPC) clusters.  In a masquerade compromise, there is little to warn a security 
administrator that an account has been compromised since the attackers can properly 
authenticate so the intrusion may be long-lasting, persistent (difficult to reverse), and act 
as a stepping stone to more serious damage beyond a single user account. With the 
motivation of detecting masqueraders on HPC clusters, we have been working to 
discriminate different types of users based on their command behavior.  
 
Our intuition is that masqueraders act differently from legitimate HPC cluster users and 
the unique HPC cluster environment is constrained such that command behavior 
discrimination is enhanced versus enterprise environments.  Since an HPC cluster 
environment should only have a minimal set of sanctioned system/application software 
available to users for performance purposes (software focused on supporting 
computation), the number of executable commands should be severely restricted.    
 
 Data from security operations reports validate this claim – while modes of attack on 
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HPC systems vary greatly they do have one common characteristic, attacks are all very 
different from legitimate user activity found in a HPC cluster environment. For instance, 
once gaining access to a purloined account, attackers will typically communicate via an 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC), download additional exploits via ftp or the web, and then 
compile these exploits and attempt their execution. While ftp and compile commands 
may be typical in an HPC cluster environment, the command sequence pattern is the key. 
 
In [9] we considered several methods to mitigate the threat from masqueraders and 
presented results from empirical testing showing that we can accurately discriminate 
enterprise users from cluster users based on their command behavior provided with a 
reasonable amount of training data (in terms of either number of commands or time 
period).   Specifically in [9] we showed that by using Support Vector Machines (SVM) 
for classification with no constraints we are able to detect masqueraders with an accuracy 
of 94.9%, together with a precision of 92.4% and a recall of 91.9%.  Constraining the 
number of commands we found that as few as 10 commands provides an accuracy of 
90%.  Constraining time we found that as short as 20 minutes had a precision over 75% 
with a recall slightly lower than 80%.  Examining the difference between the accuracy in 
number of commands versus time period reveals that the number of commands executed 
during time intervals varies significantly for different users. For instance, within 20 
minutes, the user ‘root’ may execute hundreds of commands, but other users may only 
execute one command. Therefore where monitoring is measured by fixed time intervals, 
misidentification is generally higher due to a lack of observed commands for some users. 
The number of commands is the metric for classification while monitoring time is the 
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window of observation.  
 
While this previous work based on identifying masqueraders on HPC clusters using SVM 
classification provides good accuracy at 90%, it is not good enough for a production HPC 
environment where the volume of users requires accuracy greater than 99%.   Although 
SVM classification trains on both individual commands and patterns of command usage, 
it does not provide necessary information on feature sensitivity which may be useful to 
increase masquerade detection accuracy.  
 
In this paper we seek to identify the features of command behaviors useful for identifying 
masqueraders in HPC clusters environments so SVM classification techniques can be 
incrementally improved. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
presents the unique characteristics of process accounting as our data source.  Section 3 
provides an overview of the NVision-PA system architecture. Section 4 reports results 
from the use of NVision-PA on two processing accounting logs.  We describe features for 
detecting masqueraders identified from NVision-PA statistical output.  We end with 
conclusions and perspectives on future work in Section 5. 
 
 
2.0  Background on Process Accounting 
 
The UNIX/Linux accounting system collects information on individual/group usage of 
computer system resources. A system can record every process created by every user. 
This kind of logging is called process accounting.  An example of the need for automated 
process accounting is the fact that many processes have short life spans that may escape 
   5
human detection with ps command monitoring but still be of such high volume to 
dominate system load [1]. 
 
Process accounting has potentially high value for security purposes, for instance after a 
break-in to help determine what commands a user executed, correlating evidence, and 
incident investigation [3,5,7,9].  Other examples of security-related uses include: 
 
• To hold a use accountable for some action indicated in the logs 
• To enable the extraction of patterns of use of objects, users or security mechanisms in 
the system 
• To identify security policy violations 
• To identify unsupported or vulnerable software is being used  
• To create an audit trail of the use (or abuse) that may occur from a specific user. 
• To prevent the users from abusing the system by acting as a deterrent, given that the 
users know that there is a mechanism that logs security relevant actions in the system 
 
While this work is motivated by the use of process accounting for security purposes, there 
are other uses for process accounting data. For example: (1) process accounting data is 
generally used in HPC environments to bill individual users (or groups of users) for the 
amount of CPU time that they consume [2,8] and (2) process accounting data provides an 
accurate source for workload characterization needed to tune applications and schedulers 
[1,4,6].  
 
Process accounting is performed by the UNIX kernel. Every time a process terminates, 
the kernel writes a 32-byte record to the /var/adm/acct or /var/adm/pacct file that 
includes: 
• name of the user and group who created the process 
• first eight characters of the name of the command which launched the process 
• elapsed time and processor time used by the process 
• time that the process exited 
• memory usage 
   6
• number of disk blocks read or written on behalf of the process 
• flags, including: 
– S: Process was executed by the superuser 
– F: Process ran after a fork, but without an exec 
– D: Process generated a core file when it exited 
– X: Process was terminated by signal 
 
The accounting file /var/adm/pacct is accessed by many of the accounting utilities used 
with system accounting. For example the lastcomm program displays the contents of this 
file in a human-readable format. The acctcom utility is one of the most useful tools for 
getting a quick report from the system. It can be used to show all the processes that have 
been executed by a specific user, or to show all the processes, for any user, running 
longer than x seconds etc. 
 
There are different process accounting software packages which introduce subtle 
variations in what we have generically described. The original was BSD Unix accounting, 
however, this does not have reliable messaging or consolidation reports. The open source 
Comprehensive System Accounting (CSA) package developed on Cray and IRIX 
platforms and now distributed by SGI consists of all accounting data for a given job 
identifier during a single system boot period. Red Hat Linux psacct accounting package 
contains several utilities for monitoring process activities including how long users have 
been logged on. 
 
Process accounting data is subject to some inherent limitations with respect to security 
monitoring. For our purposes, we note two such limitations here.  The first limitation is 
that process accounting does not keep track of parameters passed with the executed 
command. In fact, it only keeps track of the first eight characters of the command 
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executed. Based on this, a malicious user could link a malicious tool to one with an 
innocent name and then execute the linked file.  The second limitation it is likely that an 
experienced attacker will attempt to delete any traces including command traces by 
suspending or stopping process accounting or modifying the existing process logfile of 
traces. To counteract the disabling of process accounting, it is possible to reliably and 
securely send the command history to protected servers at regular intervals where it can 
be archived beyond reach of intruders up to the point when the operating system is 
subverted and messages cease. 
 
Lastly, there are two biasing effects with all process accounting software that must be 
considered: (1) “the Heisenberg Principle” – the processing needed to observe a system 
will impact the system, however, process accounting counters are always operational 
(whether turned on or off) with the processing impact occurring in post-processing when 
command history is flushed to the file system for analysis and (2) “the Edge Effect” – 
accounting records are written only for processes that have terminated so if a program 
runs for a long period it will not show up in the command history until the process is 
done [9]. While in this paper we focus on identifying features of  command behaviors 
useful for detecting masqueraders, in future work we plan to study both of these biasing 
effects: (1) determining the scalability limits of process accounting, both when does 
process accounting impact CPU performance and what activity level will impact process 
accounting performance and (2) determining how numerous and significant are “edge 
effect” processes.    For more details about process accounting, see [2,5,8,9]. 
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3.0  NVision-PA System Architecture 
 
NVision-PA is available from the following URL: 
<http://security.ncsa.uiuc.edu/distribution/NVision-PADownLoad.html> 
where there is also documentation on the installation procedures.   
 
Figure 1 presents the system architecture of NVision-PA. The Server is the system from 
which we have collected the Process Accounting Log File, through the process 
accounting module that resides in the kernel of its operating system. The NVision-PA 
Statistics Collector Engine executes analysis processes on the log data as input and the 
results are sent to NVision-PA GUI, where they are organized into nine tabs and 
represented in text or graphics. 
 
Figure 1. NVision-PA System Architecture 
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We have encountered two slightly different process accounting formats (and there are 
likely more we have not yet encountered). One format is found on Linux systems (e.g. 
RedHat) while the other one is found on UNIX systems (e.g. Sun OS). Our tool 
automatically recognizes either of these process accounting formats, parsing the data 
according to the recognized format. The Linux and UNIX formats differ mainly in the 
size of their respective fields (in bytes). Furthermore, the Linux format has additional 
fields (e.g. number of page faults) not found in the UNIX format.  NVision-PA processes 
only the fields common to both formats.  
 
3.1  NVision-PA Statistics Collector Engine 
The Statistics Collection Engine is the core of NVision-PA. The collection engine parses 
the process accounting log file as input and produces a number of statistical reports for 
display through the NVision-PA GUI. When designing this engine, we had to consider 
two main factors: scalability and extensibility. Scalability is the primary requirement 
since the size of those logs can grow toward Terabytes depending on the volume usage of 
the system logging and the period of observation. To satisfy scalability, we generate nine 
different reports after only one pass through the log file. A secondary requirement is 
extensibility to add new reports or different statistics should new fields be added or new 
statistics become desirable – minimal effort should be required in order to produce a new 
report. 
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Figure 2.  Statistics Collector Engine (Phase A) 
 
Figure 2 shows the first part of the Statistics Collector Engine or Phase A.   In this phase 
an iterator object, reads the input log file, parses each individual process accounting 
record from the binary format that it is found in the file and sends each record for 
processing to each of the nine different registered reports.  For extensibility, we only 
need to parse the process accounting log file once regardless of the number of reports that 
we wish to generate as long as each different report is registered with the iterator in an 
initialization phase. 
 
Figure 3 depicts when the iterator has finished reading the entire process accounting log 
file, each different registered report generates output sent it to a Statistics Collector. The 
Statistics Collector acts as an interface between the reports that generate raw output data 
and the GUI that renders the output displayed on the screen. We call this second part of 
the Statistics Collection Engine, Phase B. 
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Figure 3.  Statistics Collector Engine (Phase B) 
 
The decision was made to produce NVision-PA in Java since process accounting logs can 
be found on many different platforms and we would like this tool to be portable for all of 
those platforms. For graphics we used the open source library “Chart2D” (a java library 
for drawing two dimensional charts by Jason J. Simas) that is available under the GNU 
license.1  
 
3.2  NVision-PA Input 
Figure 4 is a screenshot of the NVision-PA GUI showing an overlapping initial browse 
window through which the user can select by browsing or filename the exact process 
accounting log file to be selected as input.   Format check occurs upon this input file 
selection.  After a file is selected and format verified, processing for all reports is 
executed. 
                                                 
1 <http://chart2d.sourceforge.net/> 
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Figure 4  NVision-PA GUI for Input Selection 
 
4.0 NVision-PA Output Results 
 
There are nine different output reports implemented in the current version NVision-PA, 
each is represented as a tab on the NVision-PA GUI. In this section we display and 
discuss results from NVision-PA for each of these nine different output reports for the 
case of process accounting logs from two different sources: (1) a multi-user Internet 
server and (2) a multi-user HPC cluster.  Specifically we wish to compare how Internet 
server command behavior output differs from HPC cluster command behavior output for 
each of the nine reports. We also discuss whether these process accounting observations 
may be generalizable beyond these specific input data sets. 
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In Figure 5 we see an example of the NVision-PA “General” tab results which contains 
high-level information about the total number of commands, total number of distinct 
commands, the starting and ending date of the log, and effective logging period measured 
in days. The desired insight of this tab report is a general overview of the selected input 
processing accounting log file.  In Figures 5A and 5B we see that both the Internet server 
and the HPC cluster processing accounting log files refer to about a month of data (31 
and 28 days respectively) which is approximately equalized for comparison.    We can 
conclude that the HPC cluster has more user interactivity over this period since it has 21 
times more executed commands (1,853,411 versus 87,137).  We can also conclude that 
the Internet server has a wider variety of the executed commands proportional to its usage 
since the ratio of distinct commands executed to total number of commands executed is 
an order of magnitude higher for the Internet server (.002) than the HPC cluster (.0004).  
“Distinct commands” in this context are defined as  commands that occur at least once in 
the log file, multiple instances of the same command are not counted – a command is 
either present in the log file and counted once or not present/not counted.  “Total 
commands” in this context are defined as each command execution instance, the same 
command executed x times is counted x times.   
 
Figure 6 presents the NVision-PA “Users (non-distinct) Commands” tab results that refer 
to the distribution of total commands over all users in the selected input log.  The desired 
insight from this tab report is the distribution of total commands2 per user executed on the 
system during the period contained in the log.  From this we can infer different types of 
  
                                                 
2 Each command execution instance is counted, the same command executed x times is counted x times.  
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(A) 
 
 
(B) 
 
Figure 5. NVision-PA General Information About PA Log File Including Total 
Non-Distinct Commands, Total Distinct Commands, and Time Period: (A) 
Internet PA Log File versus (B) HPC Cluster PA Log File.  
 
 
users based on their command behavior.  Figure 6A shows the distribution of users on the 
Internet server are clustered either at low command usage (about 40 users executed 0-
20/20-40 commands within the log) or high usage (about 35 users executed 150-
500/>500 commands within the log).  Figure 6B shows the distribution of users on the 
HPC cluster are bimodally clustered at the extremes; low usage (about 20 users executed 
between 20-40 total commands) and high usage (about 70 users executed between 150-
500/>500 total commands). 
 
Figure 7 presents the NVision-PA “Users (distinct) Commands” tab results that refer to 
the distribution of distinct commands over all users in the selected input log.  The desired  
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(A) 
 
 
(B) 
 
Figure 6.  NVision-PA Statistical Distribution of Non-Distinct Commands: (A) 
Internet PA Log File versus (B) HPC Cluster PA Log File. 
 
 
 
(A) 
 
(B) 
 
Figure 7.  NVision-PA Statistical Distribution of Distinct Commands: (A) Internet 
PA Log File versus (B) HPC Cluster PA Log File. 
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insight from this tab report is the distribution of distinct commands3 per user executed on 
the system during the period contained in the log.  From this we can infer different types 
of users based on the range of different commands executed – a user executing a small 
number of distinct commands is likely to be less capable than a user executing a wide 
variety of distinct commands.   Figure 7A shows the distribution of users on the Internet 
server is clustered at the medium range of distinct command usage (about 88 users 
executed between 10-15/15-20/20-25 distinct commands).  Figure 7B shows the 
distribution of users on the HPC cluster are bimodally clustered at the medium range of 
distinct command usage (about 25 users executed between 15-20 distinct commands) and 
at the high range of distinct command usage (about 50 users executed > 30 distinct 
commands). From this we infer that the average HPC cluster users are more capable in 
different command usage in the sense that they typically execute more distinct commands 
than the Internet server users.  
 
Figure 8 presents the NVision-PA “Top 20 Used Commands” tab results that identify the 
most frequent instances of command execution over all users in the selected input log4.  
The desired insight from this tab report is the most commonly used commands in 
different environments.   The top 20 commands on the Internet server is lead by sshd 
remote login, then self-identification commands (uname, hostname) and also mail 
commands (mail, elm, pine), neither of these command types would be expected to occur 
in a HPC cluster environment.  The top 20 commands on the HPC cluster are dominated 
by shell commands (also commonly used on Internet servers) but also includes pbs 
                                                 
3 Multiple instances of the same command are not counted – a command is either present in the log file and 
counted once or not present/not counted, e.g. the same command executed x times is counted only once. 
4  Each command execution instance is counted, the same command executed x times is counted x times. 
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(B) 
 
Figure 8.  NVision-PA Top 20 Most Frequently Used (Non-Distinct) Commands: 
(A) Internet PA Log File versus (B) HPC Cluster PA Log File. 
 
 
 
 
(A) 
 
 
(B) 
 
Figure 9.  NVision-PA Top 20 Most Frequently Used (Distinct) Commands: (A) 
Internet PA Log File versus (B) HPC Cluster PA Log File. 
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referring to a specialized cluster scheduler, rsync referring to a specialized file transfer 
application, sleep referring to delay for a specified amount of time, and libtool for using 
shared libraries.   Masquerader commands would not necessarily show up in the HPC 
cluster top 20 list since their frequency would be too low, however, automated Internet 
server processes (such as a mail spammer process) would be easily discernable as 
suspicious if they did appear. 
 
Figure 9 presents the NVision-PA “Top 20 (distinct) Commands” tab results that identify 
the most frequently used distinct commands across different users.5     The desired insight 
from this tab report is which commands have the widest user base.   The top 20 distinct 
commands on the Internet server are again predominantly shell commands but also 
include sshd remote login, self-identification commands (uname, hostname), mail 
commands (mail, pine, sendmail), and editor commands (vi).  The top 20 distinct 
commands on the HPC cluster are again predominantly shell commands but one sticks 
out – 68 HPC cluster users executed the xauth command (used to extract authorization 
records from one machine and merge with another for remote  logins  or  granting access  
to  other  users).  xauth would not be an advisable command to use outside of a trusted 
environment so it would be unlikely to appear in the Internet server command lists. Both 
“top 20” tab results also identify commands that are executed through “.profile” files that 
are potentially executed at every login of every user. For example, in Figure 9a we see  sh 
and aklog and Figure 9b we see addpath which are likely executed as part of .profile. 
 
                                                 
5 Regardless of how many instances an individual user executed a specific command, the total frequency of 
a distinct command will increase only by one if an individual user has ever executed that command. 
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Figures 10-12 refer to distribution of time parameters over commands.  The time 
parameter is divided into system time, user time, elapsed time, and defined within process 
accounting with the following parameters: 
  
ac_stime: system time spent in kernel space for the process (accurate to 0.01 second) 
ac_utime: user time spent in user space for the process 
ac_etime: total elapsed time for the process (greater than or equal to ac_utime + ac_stime) 
also known as “wall clock” or real-time (accurate to a second) 
{Note: these fields are reported in seconds with different accuracy} 
 
The relationship between these time components is as follows: 
 
 System Time(ac_stime) + User Time(ac_utime) <=  Elapsed Time(ac_etime) 
 
Figure 10 presents the NVision-PA “System Time/Number of Commands” tab results 
that refer to the distribution of system time over all commands6 in the selected input log. 
In other words, we can see how many commands had a system time of x seconds.  The 
desired insight from this tab report is the distribution of system time per command for 
different environments during the period contained in the selected input log.  We may 
expect computational science researchers in the HPC cluster environment to have 
processes with higher system times since higher system times may reflect simulations and 
other tasks that the average Internet server user would not likely execute.  The percentage 
of commands that executed with a system time of less than 0.1 seconds is comparable 
between the Internet server and HPC cluster environments; 14% and 9% respectively.   
The peak for both environments is commands executing with a system time between 1-2 
seconds; 36% of the commands in the Internet server environment and 19% of the 
commands in the HPC cluster environment – roughly double the number of Internet 
server commands executed with a system time of between 1-2 seconds than HPC cluster 
                                                 
6 Each command execution instance is counted, the same command executed x times is counted x times. 
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(B) 
 
Figure 10.  NVision-PA Distribution of System Time Over Commands: (A) 
Internet PA Log File versus (B) HPC Cluster PA Log File. 
 
 
 
 
 
(A) 
 
 
(B) 
 
Figure 11.  NVision-PA Distribution of User Time Over Commands: (A) Internet 
PA Log File versus (B) HPC Cluster PA Log File 
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commands.   The distribution of system time for the Internet server commands decays 
quickly from this peak while the distribution of system time for HPC cluster commands 
decays gradually to another bimodal peak.  The second peak for both system time 
distributions is commands that execute with a system time over 10 seconds.   Roughly 
13% of HPC cluster commands and 8% of Internet server commands execute with a 
system time over 10 seconds. 
 
Figure 11 presents the NVision-PA “User Time/Number of Commands” tab results that 
refer to the distribution of user time over all commands7 in the selected input log. The 
desired insight from this tab report is the distribution of user time per command for 
different environments during the period contained in the selected input log.   In other 
words, from this report we get an idea of how long a user is engaged with a particular 
process. For example, if users run commands like ls or cp then the average user time will 
be low while if users execute new shells or tools like gdb or emacs then the distribution 
of user times will be skewed higher. We can see from Figure 11A that the user time of 
Internet server commands peaks with 35% of all commands falling within the range 0-1 
seconds with an exponential drop-off from this peak.  In Figure 11B we see that the user 
time of HPC cluster commands does not peak but rather more closely resembles a 
uniform distribution with these percentages of commands: 21% (0-1sec), 21% (1-2sec), 
22% (2-4sec), 16% (4-8sec), 7% (8-16sec), and 13% (>16sec). 
 
Figure 12 presents the NVision-PA “Elapsed Time/Number of Commands” tab results 
                                                 
7 Each command execution instance is counted, the same command executed x times is counted x times. 
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that refer to the distribution of elapsed time over all commands8 in the selected input log. 
The desired insight from this tab report is the distribution of elapsed time per command 
for different environments during the period contained in the selected input log.   This 
report merges the two previous time reports (Figures 10 and 11) since it always holds that 
elapsed time is always great than the sum of system time plus user time.  Elapsed time 
also contains delays caused by the scheduling of processes which may or may not be 
significant in different environments.  In Figure 12A the elapsed time distribution for 
commands executed on the Internet server shows 4 peak modes: 53% (0-2, 2-4, 4-6 
seconds), 6% (10-20sec), 8% (100-200sec), and 16% (> 400sec) – which when combined 
accounts for 83% of all commands.   In Figure 12B, the elapsed time distribution for 
commands executed on the HPC cluster shows 4 similar peak modes: 25% (2-4, 4-6 
seconds), 20% (10-20sec), 6% (100-200sec), and 8% (> 400sec) – which when combined 
accounts for 59% of all commands. 
 
Figure 13 presents the NVision-PA “Memory/Number of Commands” tab results that 
refer to the distribution of memory usage over all commands9 in the selected input log. 
The desired insight from this tab report is the distribution of memory usage per command 
for different environments during the period contained in the selected input log.  In other 
words, this tab gives us an idea of the memory demands of users executing jobs in 
different environments.  The metric in processing accounting for measuring memory is 
ac_mem, the average amount of memory in units of 8K (pages) that is used by the 
command process.   Before comparing data for the different environments, it should be 
                                                 
8 Each command execution instance is counted, the same command executed x times is counted x times. 
9 Each command execution instance is counted, the same command executed x times is counted x times. 
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Figure 12.  NVision-PA Distribution of Elapsed Time Over Commands: (A) 
Internet PA Log File versus (B) HPC Cluster PA Log File 
 
 
 
 
 
(A)  
 
 
 (B) 
 
Figure 13.  NVision-PA Distribution of Average Memory Usage Over Commands: 
(A) Internet PA Log File versus (B) HPC Cluster PA Log File  (Note x-axis differs 
in 13A and 13B)   
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noted that the x axis in Figures 13A and 13B have different labels. In Figure 13A, the 
memory usage distribution for commands executed on the Internet server shows 2 peak 
modes: 53% (100-500 memory pages) and 32% (> 1000 memory pages) – which when 
combined accounts for 85% of all commands.   In Figure 13B, the memory usage 
distribution for commands executed on the HPC cluster shows only 1 peak mode which 
characterizes most of the commands: 94% (2000-7000 memory pages).  Comparing 
Figures 13A and 13B reveals that HPC cluster users execute commands with distinctly 
more memory requirements than commands executed by users in an Internet server 
environment.   
 
Lastly, this is the second data set of Internet server/HPC cluster process accounting logs 
we have analyzed, the first data set was briefly described in [9].  The results from both 
data sets are consistent so we believe them to be accurate characterizations of their 
environments.  Whether the environments from which we obtained the process 
accounting logs is typical or atypical of general Internet server or general HPC cluster 
environments is an open question.  A benchmark of standard Internet server or HPC 
cluster process accounting does not exist and may not be feasible given the wide variety 
of legitimate command behaviors.   However, what we have presented here is feature 
information that can be fed to a pattern classification algorithm, such as SVM, in order to 
enhance discrimination of command behaviors for the particular environment measured.  
This same procedure using NVision-PA may be used to enhance discrimination of 
command behaviors for any set of environments. 
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5.0 Summary 
 
NVision-PA makes available sophisticated analysis of process accounting logs using a 
Java GUI portable to most environments.  Specifically in this paper we report results 
from NVision-PA for comparing two process accounting data sets; one from an Internet 
server environment and one from an HPC cluster environment.  The features revealed by 
NVision-PA in these data sets are an incremental but significant next step in developing a 
real-time masquerade detector for the HPC cluster environment based on command 
behavior.  Beyond masquerade detection, the analysis capability of NVision-PA also 
promises to be useful in tuning complex system environments for workloads that can be 
characterized by command behaviors.  
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